




On the Determinants of Opium Consumption; An Empirical Analysis of Historical Data
van Luijk, E.W.; van Ours, J.C.
Publication date:
1998
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van Luijk, E. W., & van Ours, J. C. (1998). On the Determinants of Opium Consumption; An Empirical Analysis
of Historical Data. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-63). Econometrics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
1
ON THE DETERMINANTS OF OPIUM CONSUMPTION;
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL DATA
Eric W. van Luijk*)
Jan C. van Ours**)
June 16, 1998
ABSTRACT
Consumption of drugs is a major problem in modern society. Yet, not much is known about it from
an economic point of view. The illegal nature of drug use makes it difficult to collect reliable data
for empirical analysis. The current paper avoids this problem by using historical data that are
collected under a government regime of legal drug use. In the early twentieth century in the Dutch
East Indies (present day Indonesia) there was a government monopoly on opium. We use data
from 1930 administrative files on this monopoly to study regional differences in opium
consumption. From the nature of these differences we make inferences about the determinants of
opium consumption. We find that regional differences in opium policy, in population density and
in composition of the Chinese part of the population are the major determinants of regional
differences in opium consumption.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Drugs, especially hard drugs cause many problems in modern society like crime, corruption of law
enforcement officials and politicians, health risks, et cetera1. Yet, not much is known about the
conditions that lead some people to use drugs and other people to avoid it. The lack of knowledge
is caused by the illegal nature of the drug business, which makes it hard to collect data for empirical
analysis. Data that are collected may be highly unreliable2.
This paper avoids these problems since it uses historical data that are collected under a
government regime of legal drug use. In the early twentieth century in the Dutch East Indies
(present day Indonesia) there was a government monopoly on opium. A government bureau
within the Finance Department controlled this so-called opium regie. A lot of Chinese and
indigenous adults that wanted to smoke opium could get a permit to do so. Each district had a
central opium depot, an extensive network of official opium stores and a network of licensed
opium dens where users were allowed to smoke their opium. Vernaculars were posted above
the regie stores: “Government opium for sale here” (Rush 1990).
The colonial government of the Dutch East Indies produced annual reports on opium
consumption that contain information on a district basis about quantities of opium consumed,
numbers of opium consumers, et cetera. In Van Ours (1995) information from the period 1923-
1938 is analysed. In this study time series characteristics of the opium information are exploited
while differences between districts are assumed to be fixed and are left unexplained. Price and
income elasticities of the demand for opium are estimated for both Chinese and indigenous
consumers. The estimation results are very similar: short-term price elasticities of about -0.7, long-
term price elasticities of about -1.0. The estimated short-term income elasticity of opium is about
0.8, the long term about 1.3.
In the current paper we focus on regional differences in opium consumption at one point in
time, the year 1930. This year is very suitable for a cross-section empirical analysis since there was
a Census that revealed many characteristics of the Chinese and indigenous population which are not
available for other years. Furthermore, for the year 1930 the opium information is very detailed.
There is information for 56 districts, whereas usually in Dutch colonial publications on opium, 22
                                            
1 Miron and Zwiebel (1995) analyse these problems from an eco omic point of view and discuss the
pros and cons of drug prohibition. The bottom line of their paper is that a free market in drugs is
superior to a policy of prohibition.
2 A recent and rare example of an empirical study is Grossman, Chaloupka and Brown (1996) in which the
frequency of use of cocaine by young adults is investigated. The consumption of cocaine is found to be quite
sensitive to its price. Furthermore, the participation in cocaine consumption is lower for blacks, married
people and people with frequent religious participation. The frequency of cocaine demand (given positive
participation) is lower for people with low earnings and married or engaged people. Finally, there are
differences in cocaine consumption between states because of differences in policies with respect to marijuana
and alcohol.
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districts are distinguished. We use two indicators of opium consumption3. The first is “opium
penetration” which we calculated as the percentage of the male population that smoked
opium. The second is “average opium consumption” which we calculated as the average
quantity consumed per male inhabitant.
We want to investigate why some individuals are more vulnerable to opium use than other
individuals. We do this by analysing to what extent differences between districts in terms of
demographic, socio-economic and opium policy characteristics coincide with differences in opium
consumption. An obvious question is whether it makes sense to use district data for this purpose.
As a first check we calculated the correlation between both the opium penetration and the average
consumption of the Chinese and the indigenous. We did the calculations separately for the 38
districts of Java, the main island of the Dutch East Indies and for the 18 districts of the so-called
Outer Isles. We find the correlation coefficient of opium penetration to be significantly positive with
a value of 0.66 for Java and 0.59 for the Outer Isles (see Table 3). We conclude that there are
district specific effects that cause a positive correlation between the opium penetration of both
ethnic groups. The correlation coefficient of the average opium consumption is 0.53 for Java
and 0.50 for the Outer Isles. Again, since both correlation coefficients are significantly
positive, there must be common district specific determinants. So, it does in fact seem to make
sense to use the district data for an empirical analysis of the determinants of opium consumption.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II gives a short description of the opium history.
In section III we present demographic and socio-economic information about the Dutch East
Indies. In section IV we give an overview of the use of opium and discuss the available information.
Section V presents the results of our empirical analysis. Section VI presents the main conclusions
from our analysis and indicates which present-day drug policy lessons can be learned from our
analysis of the opium history.
II. A SHORT HISTORY ON OPIUM
In the past centuries opium was important business in Southeast Asia. British and American traders
brought opium from British India and the Ottoman Empire and exported it in large quantities to
China (Maule 1992). In smaller quantities opium was exported to areas with Chinese communities
in the Straits Settlements, French Indo-China, Siam and the Dutch East Indies. The use of opium
                                            
    3 Information about opium consumption is published in the annual account of the Opium regie of the year
1930 (Verslag betreffende den dienst der opium regie over het jaar 1930). Other information about opium
consumption is published in the chapter “Finances of the State” in the Colonial reports (Koloniale
verslagen). Information with respect to the population is published in reports of the Census of 1930 in the
Netherlands Indies, Landsdrukkerij, 1936 Batavia, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Furthermore, we use
information with respect to income taxes, which we derived from the Colonial report of 1930.
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has a long tradition in the Dutch East Indies4. In the early 17th century the Dutch took over Malaya
from the Portuguese and for a hundred years they auctioned the opium in Batavia to the highest
bidder. Since then there have been several ways in which the Dutch government directly or
indirectly controlled the opium market in the Dutch East Indies.
In the second half of the eighteenth century the opium supply was controlled by a private
organisation, the so-called Amphioen Societeit. In exchange for a fixed financial contribution this
organisation gained the right to sell opium to the highest bidder. In the nineteenth century there
were opium tax farms. Lacking sufficient administrative capacity for collecting taxes the Dutch
government sold regional rights to retail opium to the highest bidder.
At the end of the 19th century there was a lot of political discussion in the Netherlands
about the pros and cons of allowing Chinese and indigenous inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies to
consume opium. Many politicians were in favour of total prohibition. However, the large-scale
opium consumption had been a reality for a long time. Total prohibition would be difficult to
enforce. By the end of the nineteenth century a new scheme, called opium regie, was gradually
introduced. Under this scheme import, refinement and retailing were fully under control of the
government. The idea of the opium regie was not unique. The French introduced an opium
monopoly in Indo-China at the end of the 19th century. The same happened in Taiwan, which was
a Japanese colony in the period 1895-1945. The Japanese established an Opium Monopoly Bureau
that had the exclusive right to produce and sell opium in Taiwan. Wholesale and retail opium
merchants as well as opium smoking shops had to apply for a license from the government.
Chartered opium pharmacies were established to engage in the sale of opium. Those who were
diagnosed by medical doctors as addicts were given a license by the government so that they could
purchase opium from chartered pharmacies (Liu, Jin-Tan et al. 1996). The opium regie lasted until
the Japanese conquered the Dutch East Indies in 1942.
III. DEMOGRAPHICS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
A. Demographics
Table 1 gives information, which we derived from the 1930 Census of the population of the Dutch
East Indies. For reasons of presentation we group the 56 districts into three areas: Java with 38
districts, Sumatra with 10 districts and Other Isles with 8 districts5. In the Dutch colonial statistics
                                            
    4 See for an overview of the history of Indonesia Ricklefs (1993). Maddison (1989) provides information
about the economic history of Indonesia. A detailed description of the 19th century history of opium smoking
on Java is given in Rush (1990).
5 The district are the following, where the districts in bold had a strict opium regime and those in italics
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the areas Sumatra and Other Isles are usually grouped into one area: the Outer Isles. Often in
Dutch colonial statistics, there is a distinction between three population groups: Dutch, other
Europeans and Japanese, Chinese and other Asians, indigenous population. The Dutch part of the
population is not mentioned in table 1, because the number of opium users among the 260,000
Dutch inhabitants was very small. The table shows that the Chinese part of the population was also
quite small. While there were almost 60 million indigenous there were a little over 1 million
Chinese. Java was by far the most crowded area since more than two-thirds of the indigenous
population lived there. The Chinese were more evenly spread over the three areas. The share of the
adult male population was higher among Chinese than it was among indigenous. This has to do
with the many adult male Chinese who immigrated to work as coolies in plantations, especially
located in Sumatra. Overall there were about 16 million indigenous adult males and about half a
million Chinese adult males.
For male adult indigenous there are substantial differences with respect to literacy. In Java
and the Other Isles only about 12% of the male adults were literate, while this was 22% in Sumatra.
There was not a lot of difference with respect to the shares of married among male adult
indigenous. The literacy among Chinese adult males was much higher with percentages of 65 in
Java and of 41 in Sumatra. The percentage of married adult male Chinese was lower than that of
indigenous males with an average of 50% and a low number of 41% in Sumatra. For Chinese there
were major differences in the percentages of adult males born outside the Dutch East Indies. In
Java this was 37%, while in Sumatra it was 82%. The latter is direct evidence of the presence of
many Chinese immigrants in Sumatra who were hired from outside the Dutch East Indies to
perform specific types of labour.
B. Socio-economic characteristics
Table 2 shows that in 1930 there were several socio-economic differences between the areas. An
important distinction between the Chinese in Java, Sumatra and the Other Isles is the occupational
                                                                                                                                     
had a free opium regime.
I. Java:  Banten, Batavia, Buitenzorg, Krawang, Ceribon, Indramayu, West-Priangan, Mid-
Priangan, East-Priangan, Pekalongan, Tegal, Semarang, Kudus, Rembang, Blora, North-Banyumas,
South-Banyumas, Wanasaba, Kedu, Bagelen, Surabaya, Mayakerta, Grisee, Bodjanegara, Madiun,
Panagara, Kediri, Blitar, Pasuruan, Malang, Prababingga, Bandawasa, Djember, West-Madura, East-
Madura, Yogyakarta, Klaten, Surakarta.
II. Sumatra: Sumatra's West Coast, Tapanuli, Bengkulu, Lampung Districts, Palembang, Jambi,
Aceh, Sumatra East Coast, Riau and Dependencies, Bangka, Belitung.
III. Other Isles: West-Borneo, South- and East-Borneo, Celebes, Manado, Moluccas, Timor and
Dependencies, Bali and Lombok.
6
structure. From the 1930 Census it appears that almost 60% of the Chinese in Java were involved
in trade and commerce whereas only 10% participated in the production of raw materials (mostly
agriculture). In Sumatra 50% of the Chinese were engaged in agriculture and the production of raw
materials. For the other Outer Isles this was 23%. In Sumatra the percentage of Chinese involved in
trade was relatively low, while in the Other Isles this was a considerable percentage. The
indigenous population was mainly involved in agriculture, with only a few percent working in
manufacturing or trade.
The differences in structure of the working population are also reflected in the income of
the people. The average per capita income of the Chinese was about five times as high as the per
capita income of the indigenous population. In many respects the Chinese formed a middle class
between the Dutch and the indigenous inhabitants of the Indian Archipelago. While the Dutch were
mainly involved in the civil service, the army, foreign trade and agricultural production for exports,
and the indigenous population was mainly involved in agriculture and fishing, the main Chinese
occupation was commerce, which covered over one-third of working Chinese in the Census of
1930. Nearly one-fifth was engaged in industry, mainly as small craftsmen, and the rest was distri-
buted between gardening, agriculture, and coolie labour on Dutch-owned plantations and mines.
The differences in income also show if we compare the shares of males that had to pay
income tax. Only those with an annual income of more than 120 Dutch guilders had to pay income
tax. Of the indigenous male population 6% had to pay income tax, for the Chinese population this
was 35%. There are also marked differences between areas. Whereas 3% of the indigenous males
in Java had to pay income tax, this was 19% in Sumatra. The bulk of the indigenous income tax
payers in Java were salary earners. Most of the taxpayers outside Java were in the lowest income
bracket. Outside Java the great majority of the indigenous income taxpayers were own-account
workers (Booth 1988). All in all, Table 2 shows a sharp contrast between the indigenous and the
Chinese part of the population (see also The Siauw Giap 1989). The Chinese were a minority in
numbers, but on average their social and economic position was much better than that of the
indigenous population (which is still the case in present-day Indonesia).
The districts can be characterised using various indicators. Table 3 presents three of them:
the percentage of Chinese born outside the Dutch East Indies, the population density of males
(males/km2) and the average amount of income tax paid (guilders per male inhabitant). Table 3
shows that the correlation between the percentages of foreign-born Chinese and the population
densities is low. Apparently, in districts where the population density is high there is no
disproportional share of foreign born people in the Chinese community. In the Outer Isles
there is no significant correlation between the amount of income tax paid and the population
density or the percentage of foreign-born Chinese. However, in Java there is a significant
positive correlation between the amount of income tax paid and both the population density
and the share of Chinese born. Apparently, Javanese districts with a lot of wealth were also
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districts that had experienced a big inflow of foreign born Chinese. Economic wealth is
correlated with influx of Chinese workers from outside the Dutch East Indies.
IV. OPIUM USE
A. Main characteristics
In 1930 the so-called Tjandu was the only type of opium that was sold officially in the entire Dutch
East Indies. The Tjandu of the state had a standard quality. It contained 11-13 percent morphine.
Considering the narcotic effects, today one would call pure Tjandu a hard drug. Opium smokers
were predominantly male. We ignore the occasional female opium smoker and use the percentage
of males smoking opium as an indicator of opium penetration. From table 4 it appears that on
average a relative large share of the Chinese males used opium. In Sumatra on average about 20%
of the Chinese males used opium. In Java and the Other Isles opium penetration was about 5%.
The opium penetration among indigenous males was on average about 0.3%, being the highest in
Java. Chinese opium smokers on average about 460 grams per year, the indigenous smokers used
on average 140 grams per year. There were substantial differences between the areas. For Chinese
opium smokers the average consumption varied from 400 grams per year in Sumatra to 850 grams
per year in the Other Isles. For Indigenous opium smokers consumption ranged from 130 grams in
Java to 230 grams in the area of the Other Isles. As an indicator of average opium consumption we
use the average amount of opium per male inhabitant, which is the product of opium penetration
and the average amount per smoker. For the Chinese males the average consumption was about 50
grams of opium per year, the Indigenous males on average consumed 0.3 grams of opium per year.
The average annual amount of money spend on opium was about 100 guilders for an
indigenous smoker and about 320 guilders for a Chinese smoker. Again, there are big differences
between areas. The average amount spend by indigenous smokers in the Other Isles was 175
guilders, while in Java this was 101 guilders. Chinese opium smokers spent on average 621 guilders
in the Other Isles and 252 guilders in Sumatra. Opium smokers must have spent a large amount of
their income on opium since the average income per head of the working population was 170
guilders for indigenous and 840 guilders for Chinese (Polak 1943).
Opium was big business in the Dutch East Indies. The production of refined opium made
from imported raw opium was done in an opium factory in Java with about 600 employees. Opium
was distributed from this factory to depots and then to shops. In total there were 7 depots in Java
and 10 in the Outer Isles. The number of shops where consumers could buy opium was 583 in Java
and 468 in the Outer Isles.
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B. Opium policy
The government basically had prices and permits as its two policy instruments to influence opium
consumption. While in Java opium had the same price in every district, in 5 of the districts in
Sumatra and 1 district in the Other Isles there was a substantial lower price. The average price over
the whole of Sumatra was 632 guilders per kilogram of opium, while the most common price per
kilogram was 777 guilders.
In different areas there were different opium policy regimes. The most strict were so called
closed areas, where opium use was prohibited, although in cities within these areas opium use was
allowed for licence holders (in fact in none of the 56 districts opium consumption was equal to
zero). Under a less strict policy opium smoking was allowed for people with a licence. Under the
least strict policy opium smoking was free apart from general restrictions. As indicated in Table 4
there were 17 districts with a strict regime and 10 district with a free regime. The main reason for
differentiating policy along regional lines was that the opium smoking habit did not occur
everywhere at the same level. The imposition of a strict policy regime was related to the opium
smoking habits of the indigenous population. In some areas, like the Islamic districts of West Java,
opium smoking among indigenous was not widespread. If opium smoking among the indigenous
was almost absent, the sale of legal opium - if there was any - was stopped, and the use of opium
was actually forbidden. In other districts opium smoking was almost as common as nowadays
alcohol drinking in Western countries. This was especially the case in districts with substantial
Chinese communities or districts with large estates like the East Coast of Sumatra. The labour
force on these agricultural, export-producing estates was to a large degree recruited from other
parts of East Asia, and many of these displaced temporary contract workers proved to be opium
smokers on arrival, or else soon afterwards. By and large the Chinese population and contract
workers (often overlapping categories) were subject to less strict opium rules than the indigenous
population of the Dutch East Indies.
As a first investigation of the effect of the opium regime on opium use, we cluster the
districts into three groups: districts with a strict regime, districts with a free regime and
districts with an intermediate regime. The average characteristics of the three clusters are
presented in Table 5. On the basis of this table we characterise the differences between the
opium regimes as follows. Districts with a strict opium regime, of which 12 of the 17 are in
Java, differ from the other districts in terms of population density and wealth as measured by
taxes paid. Strict regime districts have a higher population density, which is probably caused
by the high share of dense populated Javanese districts. Under a strict regime the opium
penetration and average opium consumption of both Chinese and indigenous is lower than in
the other districts. Districts with a free regime have a high share of Chinese born outside the
Dutch East Indies. Opium penetration for Chinese in free regime districts is high, but for
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indigenous in this type of districts it is not different from the districts with an intermediate
regime. Our conclusion from this is that the strict opium regime is applied in those districts
where the inclination among indigenous towards smoking opium was small anyway. The fact
that also among Chinese opium penetration is smaller than in other districts seems to indicate
that the strict opium had a discouraging influence on opium use. Districts with a free opium
regime were present in the big (harbour) cities of Java (Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya) and
in other districts with many Chinese not born in the Dutch East Indies. After correcting for the
nature of the opium regime at the district level there is a relationship between the opium
penetration among Chinese and among indigenous, so the positive correlation between the
two is not created by the nature of the opium regime.
To fight opium smuggling there was an opium police force that also had steamships to fight
opium smuggling over sea. As indicated in Table 4 the amounts of illegal opium intercepted by the
opium policy were limited. All in all, there was some ambiguity in the government policy towards
opium. On the one hand the government was earning a lot of money from selling opium. Total
government revenue in 1930 was about 35 million Dutch guilders. On the other hand the govern-
ment supported societies who had campaigns against the use of opium. However, since the
government paid only 11,000 Dutch guilders in 1930 this support was limited in financial terms.
C. Hospitalised opium smokers
Official information with respect to opium use does not indicate that opium addiction was a severe
problem. In several hospitals opium addicts were treated for medical reasons, but their numbers are
small as compared to the total number of opium users. In 1930 in the Bandung hospital 2
Europeans, 23 indigenous and 224 Chinese were treated of which 195 were declared cured after
their treatment. In Modjowarna in 1929 14 indigenous and 10 Chinese were treated for their addic-
tion. In Surakarta 115 male and 2 female Chinese, 68 male and 8 female indigenous were treated,
of which 174 were declared cured after their treatment, whereas 19 failed to be cured. Medical
doctor Anthony de Mol van Otterloo (1933) did some research among 200 opium smokers in
the opium hospital Immanuel in Bandung. He concludes that the average opium smoker was
35 years old, had been using opium for 10 years and used 1400 grams of opium on an annual
basis. In his judgement a smoker who used less opium than this amount was a light smoker
and easy to cure. Someone who used more than 1400 grams of opium was considered a heavy
smoker and difficult to cure from his opium addiction. Note that this amount is substantially
higher than the average amount opium smokers consumed (see Table 4). Therefore, the
number of heavy smokers was substantially smaller than the number of light opium smokers.
Of course one has to take into account that only heavy opium smokers ended up in the
hospital. De Mol van Otterloo (1933) published individual information about some 25 opium
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smokers. From this information we find that the use of opium ranged from 850 grams per year
to 6300 grams per year. The average amount over the 25 smokers was 2390 grams/year, while
the average drops to about 2000 grams after omitting the three most heavy smokers. Almost
every opium smoker was Chinese and male (there was 1 female). Of 18 individuals we know
the age and the duration of their opium smoking. It appears that the coefficient of correlation
between the amount consumed and the age of the consumer is insignificant (-0.28). Amount
and duration are hardly correlated (correlation coefficient =-0.03), but there is a significant
coefficient of correlation of -0.47 between the amount consumed and the age at the start of
the opium smoking. So, the higher the age at which consumers started smoking, the smaller
the quantities they smoked later on.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Univariate analysis
To get an impression about the possible determinants of district differences in opium
penetration among Chinese we calculated the coefficients of correlation between on the one
hand our indicators of opium consumption and on the other hand some district characteristics.
These district indicators are the percentage of Chinese born elsewhere, the population density
and the per capita income tax paid in 1930. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation
between the opium indicators and the characteristics of the districts. We test whether we can
accept this null hypothesis or whether we have to reject it and accept that there is correlation
between the variables involved.
The results are presented in the correlation matrix in Table 3. There is a significant
positive correlation between the population density and opium penetration of Chinese in Java.
This is easily explained by the fact that in Java many Chinese live in big cities that have a less
strict opium policy. Population density does not coincide with any of the other opium
characteristics. Wealth in a district as measured by the per capita income tax is positively
correlated with opium penetration and average opium consumption, again only in Java. These
correlations probably have the same origin as the previous one since, as indicated before, there
is a positive correlation between population density and income tax in the Javanese districts. 
The percentage of foreign-born Chinese is significantly positive correlated with the opium
penetration of Chinese in the Outer Isles and with the average opium consumption of Chinese
in both Java and the Outer Isles. All in all, there are not a lot of significant correlations
between the indicators of opium use and the characteristics of the districts.
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B. Multivariate analysis
Apart from univariate analyses we also perform multivariate analyses using the following equations:
Gij = oj + 1j Xi  + ij (1)
Qij = oj + 1j Xi + /ij (2)
where G is the opium penetration, i = 1,.., 56 is an indicator of the district, j =1,2 is an indicator of
the population group (indigenous, Chinese), while X is a vector of characteristics of the districts.
Furthermore, Q is the average opium consumption, the ’s and ’s are regression coefficients and 
and / are error terms.
We use the following explanatory variables, all specified at the district level:
- Opium regime: As indicated before there where different types of opium policy. As in Table 5 we
distinguish three types of districts. We use a dummy variable that has a value of 1 for the strict
regime districts and a value of 0 otherwise. We also use a dummy variable that has a value of 1 for
the free regime districts and a value of 0 otherwise. Thus, the reference group consists of the
districts with an intermediate policy. We expect that forbidden districts will discourage opium
smoking of Chinese. For the indigenous there is a problem of endogeneity in the sense that
forbidden districts have originated from the fact that in these districts opium use among indigenous
already was low. For the Chinese population the type of opium policy may be considered
exogenous. Since for the indigenous population the strictest regime may be endogenous for the
indigenous we omitted districts with forbidden areas.
- Low price: We use a dummy variable with value 1 if the district had a lower opium price than the
777 guilders per kilogram that was paid in most districts and with a value of 0 otherwise. We use a
dummy variable in stead of a continuous variable since the price is either high or low. Districts with
lower prices are expected to have a larger opium penetration and therefore also a higher average
per capita opium consumption.
- Population density (male inhabitants/km2): This variable is expected to have a positive effect on
opium penetration. The higher the density of the population the more easy it is to consume opium
because of the neighbourhood of opium shops, dens, et cetera.
- Percentage of male Chinese born outside the Dutch East Indies: As indicated before there are
large differences in this share that probably reflects the extent to which the Chinese males are
working as a 'coolie'. The hard labour of these Chinese also stimulated their opium consumption.
So, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on the penetration of opium use among
Chinese.
- Income tax per male inhabitant: This variable reflects the average wealth within a district and is
expected to have a positive effect on opium penetration.
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Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using ordinary least squares. To account for possible
heteroskedasticity the standard errors were calculated using the White estimator for the variance
matrix of the least squares estimator.
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. Most of the results for the Chinese population
are as expected. It appears that opium penetration among Chinese males is lower in districts with a
strict regime and higher in districts with a free regime. Furthermore, opium penetration is higher in
districts with low opium prices, with a high population density and a large share of foreign-born
Chinese. Districts with more income tax have a smaller opium penetration, but the coefficient is not
different from zero at conventional levels of significance. The results with respect to the average
opium consumption of Chinese males are quite the same. Only now, the coefficient of the income
tax variable is significantly smaller than zero. We discuss possible explanations for this phenomenon
in the next subsection.
The regressions for the indigenous part of the population are performed for a smaller
number of districts. In the ‘forbidden areas’ there was hardly any or even no indigenous opium
smoker. We skipped district with fewer than 20 opium smokers. This reduces the number of
districts in the analysis from 56 to 45. The results of the regressions for the indigenous part of the
population are also shown in Table 6. The effects of a strict regime, a low price and a high
population density are very similar to what we find for the Chinese. A striking difference is that in
free regime districts neither the opium penetration nor the average consumption of indigenous
males is different from the reference group. Also, the percentage of foreign-born Chinese does not
influence opium penetration or opium consumption among indigenous people. Apparently, this
indicator reflects above all differences in opium use between incumbent Chinese and foreign-born
Chinese, while it does not reflect differences in characteristics between districts. The income tax
variable does not affect opium penetration or consumption among indigenous males.
C. Light smokers and heavy smokers
There are big differences between districts in terms of the characteristics of opium use. In Riau
(8,000 smokers) and the East Coast of Sumatra (37,000 smokers) about 28% of the Chinese males
was opium smoker with an average annual consumption per smoker of about 500 grams. On the
other hand there were Celebes (413 smokers) and the Moluccas (275 smokers) with a penetration
of 2-3% but a consumption per smoker of 1250 grams per year. Although for the indigenous
population both penetration and average consumption are much smaller than they are for the
Chinese population here too there is a wide variety with Surakarta (17,000 smokers) as the district
with the highest opium penetration but a low consumption per smoker and Jambi (5 smokers),
Bangka/Billiton (8 smokers) and West-Borneo (9 smokers) with a high consumption per smoker
but a very low penetration. At the district level there appears to be an inverse relationship between
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the opium penetration and the average amount of opium an opium smoker consumed. This
relationship may be caused by differences between the districts with respect to the distribution of
opium smokers in terms of the quantities they consume. If the differences in total opium penetration
are to a large extent differences in the opium penetration of small consumers, then such an inverse
relationship originates.
We pursue this possibility by tentatively distinguishing two types of opium smokers. We
assume that in every district there is a discrete distribution of opium users with 2 points of support,
implying that there are 2 types of smokers, light smokers and heavy smokers. Then the following
holds:
Gij  = *k Gijk (3) 
Qij  = *k (Gijk .Yijk/100) (4) 
where k=1,2 is an indicator of the type of opium smoker (light, heavy) and Y is the average
consumption per opium smoker. Now, since equations (3) and (4) have 4 unknowns for every
district and population group (Gij1, Gij2, Yij1, Yij2), we cannot do any further analysis without
making additional assumptions. Therefore, we assume Yij1=Yj1 and Yij2=Yj2 implying that a light
smoker has the same annual consumption in every district and the same holds for every heavy
smoker. So in every district the two types of smokers are the same. The district variation in average
opium consumption originates from district differences in the distribution of light and heavy
smokers. For the Chinese the largest annual district opium consumption per smoker is 1250 grams
and the smallest is 500 grams. So, we know that 0<Y21500 and Y221250. However, since the
gi2k’s are allowed to vary within these boundaries, theoretically there is an infinite number of
combinations (Y21, Y22) that will generate the data on average opium consumption. Therefore, we
impose that that in every district Chinese heavy smokers use 2000 grams of opium per year, while
all the light smokers use 200 grams per year
6
. Then, given that the average opium penetration is
10.4% and the average consumption per opium smoker is 460 grams per year, on average there are
1.6% Chinese heavy opium smokers and 9.2 % Chinese light opium smokers
7
.
For the indigenous males we follow the same procedure. The average indigenous opium
penetration is 0.3% and the average consumption per indigenous opium smoker is 140 grams per
year. If we assume that heavy indigenous smokers use 1000 grams of opium per year and light
                                            
6
 Note that the 2000 grams per year for a heavy smoker is in line with the information of De Mol van Otterloo
(1933) about heavy opium smokers.
7
 These results are not particularly sensitive to assumptions about the quantities for light and heavy smoker. If
we assume that a light smoker has 100 grams per year and a heavy smoker 4000 grams, the penetration of
heavy smokers is 1% and the penetration of light smokers is 9.8%. If we assume that a heavy smoker has 1500
grams and a light smoker has 200 grams, the penetration of a heavy smoker is 2.2% and the penetration of a
light smoker is 8.6%.
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indigenous smokers use 100 grams per year, the average penetration of heavy smokers is 0.01%
and the average penetration of light opium smokers is 0.29%.
We can study the effect of district characteristics on the penetration of heavy and light
opium consumers by specifying the following relationships:
Gij1 = oj1 + 1j1 Xi  + ij1 (5)
Gij2 = oj2 + 1j2 Xi  + ij2 (6)
After plugging equation (5) and (6) into (3) and (4) we have two equations of which the
coefficients can be estimated. So, even although we do not observe the penetration of light and
heavy smokers, under the assumptions we made we can investigate the way district characteristics
affect them. Note that in doing this we basically give a different interpretation to the estimates of
equations (1) and (2)
8
.
In the same way as before in the estimations we account for the possible presence of
heteroskedasticity. The estimation results are shown in the lower part of Table 6. It appears that the
presence of a strict opium regime has a negative effect on the penetration of heavy and light
smokers of both population groups. Free districts have a larger penetration of both types of Chinese
consumers but a smaller penetration of both types of indigenous consumers. Low prices do not
affect the penetration of Chinese heavy opium smokers. Apparently, their income is so high, that
prices are not important. Chinese light and both types of indigenous opium smokers do have a
higher penetration in low price districts. Population density has a positive effect on the penetration
of all types of consumers. The percentage of foreign-born Chinese only has an effect on the opium
penetration of both types of Chinese consumers. Finally, the per capita income tax only affects the
penetration of the heavy Chinese and indigenous consumers. It could be that smoking opium was
more a habit among middle class Chinese and indigenous then it was among higher class - higher
income earners.
For both Chinese and indigenous the coefficients of the penetration equations for light
smokers are substantially larger than the coefficients of the penetration equations for heavy
smokers. Apparently the penetration of light smokers was more sensitive to government policy or
differences in the characteristics of the population. It also means that the differences in opium
penetration between districts are mainly related with differences in penetration of light opium
smokers. This, of course, explains the inverse relationship between penetration and consumption
per smoker.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is not easy to do economic research in the area of drug consumption because of the ill gal nature
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of drug use. This paper avoids problems related to the illegal nature by using data from a period in
time when the drug investigated, opium, was not illegal at all. In fact, in the period of time, 1930,
and the area under consideration, the Dutch East Indies, opium business was controlled by the
government. The use of opium was widespread among the Chinese but also among a substantial
number of indigenous inhabitants. To investigate the determinants of opium use we analysed a
small dataset with information about hospitalised opium smokers and we analysed an administrative
dataset containing information about opium smoking in 56 districts within the Dutch East Indies. In
1930 there was a big difference in the socio-economic position of Chinese and indigenous
inhabitants. The Chinese had a higher income than the indigenous. The indigenous population was
mainly involved in agriculture and fishing, whereas the Chinese were more in commerce, industry
and coolie-labour. Despite the huge differences between the two population groups the results of
the analysis for the two groups are very much the same.
The government in the Dutch East Indies imposed different opium policy regimes to
different districts. In districts where the opium smoking among the indigenous was small anyway a
strict policy regime was introduced. However, for Chinese inhabitants of these districts it was still
possible to consume opium. Although for the indigenous the causality runs from low consumption
to policy regime for Chinese the imposition of a strict regime was exogenous to their consumption.
For both population groups we have district level information with respect to both opium
penetration (the share of males smoking opium) and average opium consumption (the quantity of
opium per male inhabitant). Under specific assumptions with respect to the distribution of light and
heavy consumers and the amounts they consume we are able to study the determinants of the
penetration of both types of smokers.
Of course the results of our analysis apply to the population of a specific geographical area
in a particular period of time. Still, from the opium history some lessons can be learned for the drug
policy of today. First, we find that in districts with strict opium regimes the opium penetration
among Chinese was lower. So, making it more difficult for people to acquire drugs will reduce
drug use, even in cases where drugs are no longer illegal. Second, differences between the districts
were mainly due to differences in the numbers of light smokers. The amount of heavy smokers was
apparently not much affected by government policy or socio-economic conditions. This indicates
that it is difficult to influence heavy drug users but much easier to influence recreational drug users.
Third, in districts with high opium price opium penetration was smaller. So, even if drugs are no
longer illegal a high price policy is recommendable. All in all, we think these are valuable lessons
from opium history.
                                                                                                                                     
8
 In fact the coefficients in equations (3) and (4) are linear combinations of those in equations (1) and (2).
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Table 1 Demographic characteristics in the Dutch East Indies by area and ethnic group in 1930
Java Sumatra Other Isles Total
Population (million)
     Indigenous 40.9  7.7  9.6 59.1
     Chinese  0.6  0.4  0.3  1.3
Population density (inhabitants/km2) 313 17  12  40
Adult male population (million)
     Indigenous 11.1  2.3  2.8 16.2
     Chinese  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.5
Male Adult Indigenous
     Literate (%) 11 22 13 13
     Married (%) 77 73 67 75
Male Adult Chinese
     Literate (%) a) 65 41 41 51
     Married (%) 55 43 57 50
     Born outside Dutch East Indies (%) 37 82 60 61
a) No separate information for Sumatra and the other isles is available
Table 2 Income and labour market characteristics in the Dutch East Indies by area and ethnic group in
1930
Java Sumatra Other Isles Total
Employees by sector (%)
     Indigenous: Agriculture  74  83  86 77
Manufacturing  14   4   4  5
Trade   3   3   7  3
     Chinese: Agriculture   9  50  23 32
Manufacturing  21  19  22 20
Trade  57  18  44 12
Income per male head (guilders) a)
     Indigenous b) 113 132    132    120
     Chinese 563 479    479    517
Income tax payers per male head (%) c)
     Indigenous   6  38  12 12
     Chinese  45  67  62 57
a) Chinese include other Asiatics
b) No separate information for Sumatra and the other isles is available
c) Data from 1928
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Table 3 Correlation coefficients district information a) b)
gChinese qChinese gIndigenous qIndigenous    pop taxes born-out
gChinese    x  0.80
**  0.66**    -  0.40**  0.28**  0.18
qChinese  0.88
**    x    -  0.53**  0.15  0.30**  0.36**
gIndigenous  0.59
**    -    x  0.97**  0.02  0.27*  0.12
qIndigenous    -  0.50
**   0.98**     x -0.03  0.23  0.04
pop -0.02  0.02    0.25  0.26    x  0.49** -0.05
taxes  0.14 -0.04  0.14  0.19 -0.26    x  0.33**
born-out  0.63**  0.62**  -0.16 -0.17 -0.35  0.38    x
a) g = opium penetration, q = average opium consumption, pop = population density males, taxes = income tax
per male head, born-out = share of Chinese population born outside the Dutch East Indies
b) North-east of the x-diagonal are the correlations for Java, South-west of the x-diagonal are the correlations
for the Outer Isles
* (** ) is a correlation coefficient significantly different from zero at a 1%-level (5%-level) of significance
Table 4 Opium users and opium consumption in the Dutch East Indies by area and ethnic group in 1930
Java Sumatra Other Isles        Total
Opium penetration (% of males)
     Indigenous  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.3
     Chinese  5.0 18.9  3.6 10.8
Opium consumption (kilograms/user)
     Indigenous  0.13  0.18  0.23  0.14
     Chinese  0.58  0.40  0.85  0.46
Opium consumption (guilders/user)
     Indigenous 101 113 175 105
     Chinese 450 252 621 316
Opium price (guilders/kilogram) 777 632 738 701
Illegal opium (%)  1.3  0.2  0.8   0.7
Low price districts (number)  0   5  1  6
Strict regime districts (number) 12   3  2 17 
Free regime districts (number)  3   5  2 10
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Table 5 Characteristics of districts with different opium regimes
Strict regime Free district Other districts Total
Population density (100 males/km2)  0.34 0.14 0.18 0.20
Income tax per male head (guilders)  0.82 2.44 0.81 1.12
Chinese born outside (%/adult male)  31  48   51 50
Low price districts (number)   2   3    1  6
Chinese opium penetration (%/male)  3.2 16.7  6.1 10.8
Indigenous opium penetration (%/male)  0.06   0.29  0.46 0.30
Chinese consumption (grams/male)  24.0   70.0  34.4 49.8
Indigenous consumption (grams/male)  0.10   0.37  0.63 0.40
Number of districts 17  10  29 56
Table 6 Estimation results penetration and consumption for the Chinese and Indigenous populationa)
Chinese Indigenous
Penetration Consumption Penetration Consumption
Strict regime     -1.83 (2.0)**  -11.6 (2.3)**  -0.40 (3.9)**   -0.55 (4.1)**         
Free regime  3.04 (1.5)   12.5 (1.7)* -0.09 (1.0) -0.17 (1.8)*
Low price  6.19 (2.2)**   15.8 (1.7)*    0.30 (2.9)**  0.49 (3.2)**
Pop.density males  1.79 (2.2)**   9.56 (3.1)**  0.19 (3.5)**  0.22 (3.2)**
Born outside   0.14 (3.6)**   0.96 (4.3)** -0.001 (0.4) -0.002 (0.4)
Income tax -0.43 (0.8) -6.01 (3.4)** -0.02 (0.9) -0.05 (0.6)
R2  0.540  0.542  0.339  0.341
Penetrationb) Heavy smokers Light smokers Heavy smokers Light smokers
Strict regime     -0.44 (2.1)** -1.39 (1.7)* -0.017 (3.4)** -0.39 (3.9)**
Free regime  0.35 (1.3)  2.69 (1.4) -0.009 (1.8)* -0.08 (0.9)
Low price  0.19 (0.6)  6.00 (2.2)**  0.020 (2.7)**  0.27 (2.8)**
Pop.density males  0.33 (2.8)**  1.46 (1.9)*  0.003 (1.2)  0.19 (3.5)**
Born outside  0.04 (4.1)**  0.10 (3.1)** -0.0001 (0.2) -0.001 (0.4)
Income tax -0.29 (4.0)** -0.15 (0.3) -0.003 (2.0)** -0.017 (0.8)
R2  0.540 0.542 0.339 0.341
a) Absolute t-values in parentheses; the constants of the regression-equations are not shown; R2: correlation
coefficient.
b) Assumption: Chinese heavy opium smokers use 2000 grams per year, light smokers 200 grams per year.
Indigenous heavy opium smokers use 1000 grams per year, light opium smokers 100 grams per year.
* (** ) is a coefficient different from zero at the 10%-(5%-)level of significance.
